Law in modern market societies serves both democratic and economic functions. In its economic function, law is a service, a means of enhancing the value of transactions and organizations. Yet modern market economies continue to rely on the state, rather than the market, to provide this service. This paper investigates whether private provision of law may be superior to public provision. We look in particular at corporate law, where there is a substantial literature exploring the e¢ ciency implications of "regulatory competition" and compare this competition with market competition between private providers. Drawing from the well-known framework of spatial models of imperfect competition, we argue that while neither public nor private competition may lead to the optimal corporate law regimes, there are at least some reasons to believe that private provision may be preferable. Speci…cally, we present a model that demonstrates in which regulatory competition is likely to produce widespread emulation, and little innovation. Private competition, in contrast, is more likely to lead to greater "product" di¤erentiation, which bene…ts heterogeneous consumers of corporate law services in the short term. Moreover, such di¤erentiation also has long-term bene…ts, as providers are able "learn" more about business organizations' demand-side characteristics, and thus tailor their services to business needs more e¤ectively.
Introduction
In modern market democracies, law serves a multitude of functions. It regulates the relationship between state and citizen, providing the framework for democratic governance. It protects individual rights, accomplishes the transfers inherent in the welfare state, and maintains social order. And it provides the structure for economic activity: establishing property rights and providing a means of commitment and dispute resolution to support transactions and organizations.
The democratic functions of law-those that involve the fundamental social contract between the governed and the government-are provided almost exclusively by state actors: public courts and legislatures established and regulated in turn by constitutional documents or principles. Most notions of democratic legitimacy virtually require that the state play this role. Indeed, a basic principle of democracy is taht the state may exercise power and only exercise power vis-a-vis the governed through institutions that are accountable, ultimately, to the polity.
What is less clear, however, is why the economic functions of law-the market structuring functions-are produced by the state. Why does the state assume responsibility for designing the structure of the relationships within and between economic entities when the instrumental objective is not democratic legitimacy, but rather market e¢ ciency? Law in its economic function is largely a service. It enhances the value of transactions. it coordinates activities, provides a means of commitment and resolves disputes in the cooperative endeavors that characterize economic activity. The optimal provision of law in these functions means the e¢ cient design and implementation of the rules that structure and regulate the market economy.
Had…eld (2000, 2001 ) has explored these issues in general terms, raising the question whether the economic functions of law might be better provide by private, competitive, entities rather than the state. In this paper, we explore a speci…c instance of this question-namely the e¢ ciency implications of public versus private provision of the law of corporations. Corporate law allows the creation of a distinct legal entity, capable of engaging in transactions (owning property, lending and borrowing capital, entering into and enforcing contracts) as an actor separate from its shareholders. When corporate law is functioning well it o¤ers e¢ cient means of accomplishing these functions. Our question, then, is whether we should expect public entities to provide e¢ cient corporate law or whether competitive private entities would do a better job.
E¢ ciency analysis preoccupies the literature in corporate law. This literature, however, has focused on the question of whether "competition" between the states for the "business" of supplying corporate charters and an associated law of corporations to incorporating …rms will lead to e¢ -ciency. In one view (Winter 1977 , Dodd and Leftwich 1980 , Fischel 1982 this competition, by analogy to what happens when private …rms compete to provide goods, is a "race to the top," achieving e¢ ciency as states with less e¢ cient o¤erings lose out to those with more e¢ cient o¤erings. In other views (Cary 1974 , Bebchuk 1992 , there are imperfections in this competition which impede the race (such as agency problems which cause states to cater to the interests of managers, who control the incorporation decision, rather than shareholders) sometimes leading to a "race to the bottom" and a need for federal as opposed to state regulation. In a recent version of this view, Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001) suggest that, at least with respect to take-over law, competition between the states has resulted in the states all essentially o¤ering the same, sub-optimal, restrictions on takeovers.
Regardless of whether one adopts the optimistic or pessimistic view, what this literature overlooks is the option of private, rather than public, provision of corporate law. Even more fundamentally, it has generally not taken care to examine the nature of "competition" between states and legislatures and the aptness of analogizing state competition to competition between pro…t-maximizing …rms. 1 Most of the attention has been focused on demand side imperfections, namely agency problems between managers and shareholders. Even when attention is paid to the nature of supplyside pressures and possible imperfections, as in Macey and Miller's (1987) interest-group model of competition, the assumption persists that the revenues generated by a state's corporate law regime (whether collected by the treasury or by local corporate lawyers), on the margin, spur the "state" to exploit opportunities to increase revenue by making corporate law more attractive to incorporating …rms. Finally, as some commentators have pointed out (Bebchuk and Ferrell 2001) , even the empirical tests suggesting that there are positive returns to incorporating in Delaware as opposed to other 1 Participants in this literature have at times observed that the speci…cs of state "competition" are poorly de…ned. Romano (1985) points out that those writing in this literature "never clearly specify what the states are actually supposed to be maxiizing, such as net or gross revenues." (p.228,n3.) Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) raise the question of what legislator's motives are, and observe that "no legislator can capture the bene…ts to the state of increased revenues" (p. 216). Bebchuk (1992) discusses legislators' (and other state actors') incentives and concedes that they may be multi-faceted and complex, but concludes that it is nonetheless appropriate to assume that "a state's interest in attracting incroporations shapes the behavior of the individuals actually involved in the state's lawmaking process." (p. 1454) 'competing' states (Dodd and Leftwich 1980 , Romano 1985 , Daines 2001 do not support the conclusion that competition between the states leads to e¢ cient corporate law; they only support a conclusion that Delaware's corporate law may be less ine¢ cient than others. 2 Is it in fact the case that competition between the states can lead to e¢ cient production of corporate law? What are the incentives facing courts and legislatures to produce e¢ cient law? Even if it were shareholders rather than managers making the selection of state of incorporation, what basis is there for thinking that states will behave like private pro…t-maximizing …rms, allowing us the bene…t of the welfare theorems that indicate that "competition" will lead to socially-optimal outcomes? This paper takes a …rst step towards addressing these questions, explicitly modeling the e¢ ciency characteristics of public versus private provision of corporate law. We model the incentives of legislators explicitly as incentives to capture private bene…ts, which is accomplished by the costly transformation of public revenues into increased reelection chances. We allow for the (realistic) possibility that there is not a single optimal corporate regime: we assume that incorporating …rms are heterogenous with respect to the ideal regime. 3 Finally, we allow for learning about the distribution of incorporating …rms with respect to ideal corporate law and innovation by corporate law providers to meet the needs of these …rms.
We demonstrate that under plausible conditions (most importantly, that the marginal private bene…t arising from an increase in public revenues is eventually outweighed by the marginal private cost to the legislator of achieving that bene…t) competition between the states does not lead to the optimal corporate law regimes and that the regimes resulting from competition among private pro…t-maximizing entities achieve greater e¢ ciency. Speci…cally, we demonstrate that states will tend to emulate one another: state competition will lead to both insu¢ ciently diverse corporate law offerings and o¤eringss that will generally bear no relation to the optimal structure for incorporating …rms. Moreover, state providers of corporate law will fail to learn about the distribution of incorporating …rms and will not innovate to produce regimes that better suit the needs of these …rms. Private providers, on the other hand, while perhaps also failing to provide 2 There are reasons to question even this inference, as these tests may not adequately account for the confounding fact that …rms that (re)incorporate in Delaware and enjoy abnormal positive returns do so because of factors other than the quality of Delaware corporation law. 3 The regulatory competition has sometimes noted the question of heterogeneity among incorporating …rms. See Posner and Scott (1980) and Baysinger and Butler (1985) .
the socially optimal set of regulations, will have a greater tendency to di¤er-entiate their o¤erings and hence better serve the needs of a heterogeneous population of incorporating …rms. They will also realize greater incentives to learn and design new regimes tailored to the distribution of incorporating …rms.
Our results highlight the fundamental insight that "competition" beteween public entities such as legislatures cannot be simply analogized to competition between private entities. Legislatures in our model do face an incentive to capture the business of incorporating …rms and, especially, fear losing that business. But the rewards they face-satisfying voters and campaign contributors and hence achieving reelection-do not create the kind of marginal incentive that lead to e¢ cient o¤erings. Legislators only bene…t from increasing public revenues from corporate law to the extent that they are able to transform those revenues into private bene…ts. The marginal bene…t to them is not equal to the marginal increase in net revenues (pro…ts). Moreover, because we believe it is plausible to assume that the marginal bene…t to the legislator is eventually zero, in equilibrium legislators are uninterested in competing for additional revenues. This is a fundamental distinction between state "competition" and private competition and the basis for our conclusion that private entities will, in general, o¤er more e¢ cient corporate law regimes.
We develop the model in Section II and prove our results for the static case in Section III and the dynamic (learning and innovation) case in Section IV. Section V interprets our results, discusses their generalization and limitation, and o¤ers concluding remarks.
A Model of Law Provision
In this section, we develop our arguments more formally, using a familiar spatial competition framework drawn from the industrial organizations literature. Our principal aim here is to demonstrate more precisely how, insofar as public providers have incentives that diverge from simple pro…t maximization, regulatory competition among public providers of corporate law might di¤er considerably from that which would be provided privately. We identify both short-and long-run di¤erences between regulatory and private competition predicted by the model. In the short run, public providers produce substantive law that di¤ers considerably from that which private competitors would o¤er, favoring emulation over product di¤erentiation. In the long run, emulation among public providers leads to less equilibrium learning than private provision would generate, hampering states'ability to tailor their o¤erings over time to "…t" the characteristics of the regulated population.
The Demand Side: Incorporating Firms
Consider a population of pro…t-maximizing …rms, independently selecting among a limited menu of standard-form corporate governance regimes that they might adopt. This is the decision of "where" to incorporate and the regime governing the corporate charter. Throughout what follows, assume that all …rms within the relevant population wish to incorporate, and place a relatively large value on so doing. Given this desire, the problem that each …rm faces is one of …nding the best …t: i.e., the corporate governance regime that best matches the organization's speci…c needs.
To represent this dilemma conceptually, we posit that …rms are heterogeneous in nature, and that each …rm can be identi…ed with a unique governance regime that is "ideal" for that …rm. For example, one type of …rm may be particularly well suited to a governance regime that gives great deference to managerial discretion (e¤ectively adopting an extreme form of the business judgment rule), while another might be well suited to a structure that heavily scrutinizes managerial decision making. Yet another …rm's ideal organizational structure, in contrast, might lie somewhere between these extreme ends of the spectrum. In order to capture the ‡avor of this regulatory environment, suppose that the universe of possible governance structures can be represented by a one-dimensional interval, ranging -for example -from highly deferential (on the left boundary) to highly invasive (on the right). 4 Because of the uniqueness of this ideal point, each individual …rm can be associated with an organizational type, which we denote by x 2 [0; 1] :When matched up with its ideal governance form, each …rm would be willing to pay up to K > 0 dollars to procure governance services. For the purposes of this paper, we make the simplifying assumption that K is relatively "large" relative to other parameters of the model. 5 Since the number of governance forms available in practice may be limited, a representative …rm must factor in at least two considerations when deciding which governance regime to select. First, it will care about the price (which can include chartering fees, anticipated dispute resolution costs such as legal fees, and even taxes when the provider is public) 6 that the provider charges for a …rm to organize thereunder. All else held constant, regimes that charge low prices are more attractive than those that charge high fees. Second, the …rm will care about how well the governance scheme it chooses "…ts"with its organizational type. Explicitly, should a …rm of type x choose an organizational structure of type a 6 = x; the …rm must incur a cost to remedy the mismatch between its innate organizational needs and the chosen governance regime. One way of doing so is to re-shape its authority relationships to track that which is envisioned in the governance regime; or alternatively, the …rm may hold its organizational structure constant and either run the risk of inappropriate (sub-optimal) legal interventions or expend costs to, if possible, "contract around"the rules provided by the governance regime, supplementing them with more tailored terms.
In either case, regardless of whether the …rm adapts itself to …t the governance structure or vice versa, its e¤ort is assumed to come at a cost (x a) 2 ; where > 0: Note that this adaptation cost increases in the (squared) distance between the governance scheme and the …rm's type. All told, then, if the provider of governance scheme a i charges a price of p i for its chartering services, the total cost to the …rm of type x adopting this structure will be:
Thus, if it chooses to incorporate, each …rm will do so with the provider that imposes the lowest expected cost. To illustrate, suppose that two providers, A 1 and A 2 ; o¤ered governance / price packages of (a 1 ; p 1 ) and (a 2 ; p 2 ) ; respectively, and assume (without loss of generality) that a 1 a 2 : A …rm with ideal structure x would strictly favor incorporating with A 1 rather than
If a 1 = a 2 , this implies that the …rm incorporates with whichever provider has a lower price, unless p 1 = p 2 , in which case the …rm randomizes equally between the two providers. If a 1 6 = a 2 , then a …rm that chooses to incorporate wil do so with A 1 if the following holds:
and with A 2 if x > x : (Should x = x ; we shall assume that the …rm randomizes, incorporating with each provider with probability 1 2 ). Many conventional models of spatial competition (e.g., Hotelling 1929; Salop 1979 Salop , 1982 assume that the distribution of customers is common knowledge. Such an assumption is a bit extreme for the regulatory competition we envision here, since one critical question in this debate is how much innovation (if any) providers produce as they learn over time about the preferences of the communities they regulate. Thus, rather than assume the distribution of organizational types to be known with certainty, we suppose instead that …rm types are distributed according to a CDF denoted by F (xj ) ; where = f 1 ; 2 g represents a distributional parameter that itself is a random variable, with associated conditional density function f (xj ).
The realized value of is meant to embody where the bulk of …rms are "located" in regulatory space, and the fact that is itself a random variable re ‡ects the notion that providers are not fully informed ex ante about this location (but might learn about it over time). To keep things analytically tractable, we make three simplifying assumptions about the structure F (xj ) consistent with these notions. First, we assume that the true population of …rms is destributed along one of two partitioning subintervals of [0; 1] ; each having length 1 2 : Thus, if = 1 ; the distribution is "skewed"toward the lower sub-interval of the unit interval, so that all …rms are located between 0and 1 2 : Second, we suppose that viewed ex ante, each realization k occurs with equal probability 1 2 : And …nally, we assume that regardless of which value of obtains, the population of …rms is distributed uniformly along the corresponding subinterval. (All of these assumptions can be simpli…ed without substantially changing our results 7 ). Formally, then, for any k 2 f1; 2g ; the density of x conditional on k takes the form:
In the absence of information about the realization of ; the unconditional density of x is simply the expectation of f (xj k ) over all realizations of :
which corresponds to a uniform "expected" distribution of …rms along the unit interval.
Private Providers
Private providers have a conventional maximand in our model. We assume that private providers operate to maximize their total expected variable profits. Explicitly, each …rm i chooses a location a i and a price p i to maximize its net pro…ts. Each unit of output (i.e., set of corporate governance services) that the provider produces comes at a marginal cost of c, which we assume to be constant across …rms. Let D i (a i ; p i ; a i ; p i ; ) denote the demand generated by …rm i when the …rm's competitors o¤er (possibly vector-valued) combinations of locations and prices of a i and p i ; respectively, and the population parameter is : Note that this implies the following equations for demand:
Consequently, …rm i's expected pro…t is given by
which we assume to be the maximand of private providers. And thus, each provider takes its competitors'strategies as given and solves the following:
Public Providers
The central premise of the regulatory competition literature is that legislators (and other public actors) e¤ectively behave like pro…t-maximizing …rms, choosing laws and regulations that maximize state "pro…ts." 8 Our principal contribution is to challenge that assumption.
There is no settled model of what motivates legislators and in particular there is substantial disagreement about the extent to which legislators are motivated by the public interest as opposed to their own private bene…ts, such as reelection or the pursuit of private policy goals, in exercising their public o¢ ce. The regulatory competition literature has not attempted to specify what motivates legislators in choosing corporate law regimes beyond the assumption that legislators will choose a regime that maximizes the state's net revenues (taxes and other state revenues minus public expenditures). This does not adequately account for legislator incentives however because it does not explain why legislators gain utility from increases in state revenues. Unlike the shareholders of a …rm, these are not revenues that legislators can directly (costlessly) convert to their own private consumption.
The implicit model in the regulatory competition literature could be a public interest model: legislators are motivated by their obligation to improve the …scal position of the state. But if legislators were truly motivated by public interest, it would be hard to explain why they choose legal regimes that maximize revenues rather than simply choosing the optimal legal regime from a social welfare point of view. The very point of the regulatory competition literature, however, seems to be that "states"won't choose the optimal legal regime unless they have a monetary incentive to do so, namely generating tax and other revenues. Clearly, then, the regulatory competition model has in mind something other than legislators acting on the basis of pure public interest. Once we recognize that "states" do not make legal regime choices, legislators (and other public actors such as courts) do, however, we cannot simply appeal to the increase in state revenues as the "private" bene…t that spurs regulatory competition. We need to explain how state revenues are converted into private bene…ts for legislators.
The central feature of our model of public providers of corporate law is an assumption that it is costly for legislators to convert state revenues into private bene…ts. It is the costliness of capturing private bene…ts from state revenues that constitutes the essential di¤erence between public and private competition and explains why we predict that public providers will not do as well as private providers in generating welfare-improving corporate law regimes.
To make this concrete, we adopt one of the conventional assumptions from the positive political economy literature (see e.g., Mayhew 1974, Fiorina 1977) and assume that legislators derive utility from holding o¢ ce and are thus motivated to achieve reelection. Our results doe not depend on the particular private bene…t obtained by the legislator; what is important is the assumption that private bene…ts are not equal to public revenues, but rather are procured from public revenues at some private cost to the legislator. Thus we can reformulate the interpretation of the model to replace reelection with the pursuit of personal policy preferences or personal consumption (such as the enjoyment of prestige or status). We discuss the model in terms of reelection only for concreteness.
Speci…cally, we assume that each state i has a single legislator A i who selects the state's corporate governance regime and sets the price (taxes and other fees) simultaneously with her counterparts in other states. (Note that by assuming a single legislator in each state we bias our result towards the conclusion of the regulatory competition literature which assumes that a state acts like a uni…ed decisionmaker.) A legislator who achieves reelection enjoys private bene…ts U > 0; a legislator who loses o¢ ce receives U = 0.
Let q i be the probability of reelection. We can interpret the standard regulatory competition model to be an assumption that q i is a function of the state's net corporate law revenues, i , and we adopt this assumption also. We also assume, however, that public revenues increase reelection chances q i only through the expenditure of costly e¤ort on the part of the legislator. The legislator may have to publicize her accomplishments to voters in order to sway their votes. She may have to entertain lobbying e¤orts or engage in research to determine where to most e¤ectively (from a reelection/campaign …nance perspective) direct public expenditures paid for with corporate law revenues. Let r i be this cost. We assume that r i is also a function of net revenues, i . We assume that q i ( i ) and r i ( i ) are both continuous and twice di¤erentiable on [0; 1):
We can then de…ne a function, w i , the net private bene…t realized by the legislator as a result of generating net corporate law revenues:
We impose a condition on this private bene…t function, namely that there exists a …nite threshold (denoted by i ), such that for values of i below i ; w i is non-decreasing and beyond i ; w i is non-increasing. Speci…cally, for
that is, the marginal private cost of increasing reelection chances exceeds the marginal private (reelection) bene…t to the legislator. Thus beyond i net private bene…t is decreasing in public revenues and we can de…ne w i , the maximum net private bene…t that the legislator can obtain from generating corporate law revenues for the state. The condition we impose on w i can be motivated in several ways. The simplest is to posit a world in which corporate law revenues are, at their maximum, so small as to have negligible e¤ect on a legislator's reelection chances. Kahan and Kamar (2002) suggest this may be the case, providing evidence that "no state stands to gain meaningful tax revenues or legal business from chartering …rms." In our model, this would amount to q 0 i ( i ) = 0 for all i or i = 0. Because we want to take the regulatory competition claim seriously, in the sense that legislators could face an incentive to improve their corporate law o¤erings in order to increase improve their re-election chances, we assume
and de…ne w = w(0). Then condition (9) implies that
Even if some small reelection gains may be achieved from generating corporate law revenues, however, it may plausibly be the case that the cost of conveying this information to voters or potential campaign contributors in a meaningful and e¤ective way quickly exceeds the marginal bene…ts of doing so ( i = ). Condition (10) can also be anchored in a median voter model (e.g., Black 1948). In a full information model without uncertainty with voters arrayed along a single-peaked dimension, the legislator achieves reelection with certainty at the point at which the median voter decides to vote for her. If the median voter is motivated by the legislator's ability to generate revenues for the state (used to purchase public goods, for example), then there is a level of revenue i at which the median voter will choose the legislator over her challengers. This version of the median voter model would imply q i is a step function equal to zero up to i and equal to 1 at and beyond i . This median voter model would satisfy condition (10) even in the absence of costs associated with e¤orts to communicate with the median voter and hence obtain his or her vote. More generally, however, if there is uncertainty about the median voter's behavior and preferences it is plausible to assume that the probability of securing the median voter's vote increases as i grows but that simultaneously the cost of e¤orts to secure that vote also increase, such that eventually the marginal cost exceeds the marginal bene…t. These costs may come from straightforward advertising costs, which increase on the margin as the e¤ort is made to sway voters who are more and more demanding. The costs may come from the limited capacity of the legislator to devote e¤ort to personally conveying information to voters through campaign speeches, appearances, and so on.
In a more general model, with voting and campaign contributions dependent on a multitude of factors, costs associated with transforming public revenues into private bene…ts may also increase on the margin, and so exceed the marginal bene…t, as a legislator seeking reelection is forced to go after voters or contributors that are farther removed from his or her core constituency. These costs may come directly from the cost of communicating with a group that is less inclined to hear one's message or distrustful: some voters, for example, probably cannot be swayed to vote for some legislators no matter how e¤ective they are at raising public revenues. These costs may also come indirectly from the need to juggle greater con ‡icts across constituencies-trading one group's interests against another's and hence incurring a cost with the losing group.
Marginal costs of improving reelection chances may also begin to exceed marginal bene…ts in a world in which powerful constituencies are created that pressure a legislator to compromise other goals, such as the achievment of privately preferred policy outcomes. This may be a particularly important source of distortion for legislators with respect to corporate law. When a state attracts increased business from corporations, it not only generates increased public revenues through taxes and other fees, it also generates increased private income for lawyers in the state. Corporate lawyers are thus an increasingly important source of campaign funds, and an increasingly powerful constituency.
Regardless of which interpretation one chooses, the legislator's problem can be expressed as one of selecting a governance and pricing regime to maximize her expected net bene…ts from reelection. Equivalently, each public provider takes its competitors'strategies as given and solves the following:
For simplicity, in what follows we assume that the providers are symmetric, such that w i (:) = w (:) and i = for all i:
We now turn to the derivation of the socially optimal corporate law regime and the equilibrium o¤erings of private and state providers. We begin with the static one-period solution in which the distribution of incorporating …rms is unknown and we assume that there are two potential providers. We denote these providers as a 1 and a 2 and assume (without loss of generality) that a 1 a 2 .
In analyzing the equilibria of the game (particularly for the case of public providers), it may sometimes become necessary to select among multiple equilibria for the game. In such instances, we shall impose a (relatively intuitive) Pareto criterion as to the payo¤s of the providers for selecting among these equilibria. This criterion is embodied in Assumption P below:
Assumption P: Consider an equilibrium of the location/pricing game for the provision of corporate law, denoted by fa 1 ; a 2 ; p 1 ; p 2 g yielding payo¤ s to the providers of 1 and 2 : Such an equilibrium is selected with positive probability if and only if there exists no alternative equilibrium fa 0 1 ; a 0 2 ; p 0 1 ; p 0 2 g yielding payo¤ s 0 1 and 0 2 such that 0 i i 8i;and 0 j > j for some j 2 f1; 2g :
The rationale behind Assumption P is quite simple. It essentially asserts that the most plausible equilibria (from the providers'perspective) are the ones that are not Pareto dominated, and that providers will always be able to coordinate on one such equilibrium rather than selecting an alternative that makes no provider better o¤ while making some provider(s) worse o¤. This assumption is appropriate for our goal of testing the e¢ ciency claims of the regulatory competition literature in that the literature assumes states act to maximize state revenues. Note that Assumption P is relatively weak in the sense that it does not dictate a choice among equilibria on the Pareto e¢ cient domain. On the other hand, the assumption applies only to the payo¤s of the providers and not that of the consumers. And thus, Assumption P may nonetheless select against socially e¢ cient allocations once consumer welfare is taken into account. This too is appropriate for testing the claims of the regulatory competition literature, which assumes that states require a monetary incentive in the form of revenue and do not act in the public interest by simply selecting optimal corporate law regimes.
Socially optimal locations
Consider …rst the social planner's problem of optimally locating two corporate governance regimes in the static version of the game. The social planner wishes to choose locations fa 1 ; a 2 g, and a correspondence a : x ! fa 1 ; a 2 g to minimize the expected social costs due to adaptation, or:
Analysis of this problem leads to the following proposition:
In the absence of knowledge about the realized value of ; and a regime with two providers, the socially optimal locations (in the sense of minimizing total expected adaptation costs) are at a 1 = 1 4 and a 2 = 3 4 ; and the socially optimal assignment rule is:
Proof: Since the prices paid are merely transfer payments, the total social cost of a …rm with ideal point x incorporating at a i is given by:
Thus, for a given a 1 and a 2 ; the social planner would choose a correspondence that assigns the …rm to a 1 if and only if:
At the optimum, given that absence of knowedge about 's realized value implies that …rms are uniformly distributed, it must be the case that the maximum distance travelled by any …rm is the same for each location and for …rms on either side of each location. This implies that:
Solving yields a 1 = : From a social welfare perspective, variety is clearly desirable, so that incorporating …rms can choose the location that is least costly for them to adopt. At the same time, Proposition 1 makes clear that there can be such a thing as "too much" di¤erentiation. In particular, it is not optimal to o¤er corporate governance packages that are polar opposites of each other. Under these regimes, any incorporating …rm whose needs lay somewhere in the middle would bear an unnecessarily large cost of adapting to either extreme o¤ering.
Private Providers
Having set the baseline for comparison re ‡ected in the social planner's problem, consider now how private providers will locate in equilibrium. Note …rst that if a 1 = a 2 ; then the …rms will compete only as to price (in Bertrand fashion), driving price to marginal cost c; and pro…ts to zero. Suppose instead that a 1 6 = a 2 (as we will show holds in the equilibrium). Recall that the expected density (that is, in the absence of knowledge about the realization of ) of …rm types is uniform on [0,1]. Then we can write provider 1's expected demand as:
Its pro…ts are therefore given by:
Similarly, …rm 2 will face expected pro…ts of:
Each …rm will choose a location and price pair (a i ; p i ) to maximize pro…ts, which in turn yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2: In the absence of knowledge about the true value of ; private pro…t-maximizing providers will locate at a 1 = 0 and a 2 = 1; and charge prices of p 1 = p 2 = (c + ) : This equilibrium is unique.
Proof: (See d 'Aspremont et. al. 1979 ) Suppose …rst a 1 and a 2 are …xed, and consider …rm 1's choice of price. Maximizing 1 (p 1 jc; p 2 ) with respect to p 1 and 2 (p 1 jc; p 2 ) with respect to p 2 yields reaction functions:
Solving for p 1 and p 2 yields:
Under these solutions, denote the maximized pro…ts for given a 1 and a 2 for each provider as 1 and 2 . Now consider provider 1's maximization problem with respect to location. By the envelope theorem,
Substituting for p 1 and p 2 yields
This implies that pro…ts are always increasing as provider 1 moves to the endpoint, 0. Similarly, pro…ts for provider 2 are always increasing as it moves to the endpoint, 1. Prices at these locations are p 1 = p 2 = (c + ) :
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. A provider's choice of location has two competing e¤ects. On the one hand, moving away from one's competitor can reduce the size of the market served. On the other hand, increasing the distance between providers implies that a provider can charge a higher price because customers have a longer distance to travel to the competitor location. Proposition 2 demonstrates that when incorporating …rms are uniformly distributed and face quadratic costs, the price e¤ect dominates the market share e¤ect, and thus pro…ts are increasing in the distance to the competitor provider. This drives both private providers to maximize the distance between them, resulting in the corner solution fa 1 ; a 2 g = f0; 1g. 9 Compared to the social optimum, then, private competition can lead to excessive product di¤erentiation among competitors.
Public Providers
Now consider the game where corporate law is provided by public entities such as states. Denoting i = (p i c) D i and once again assuming that a 1 a 2 ; legislator A 1 's expected utility is given by E [w ( 1 )] and A 2 's is given by E [w ( 2 )] :Note once again that under condition (9), although legislators may receive some marginal private bene…t from raising state revenues, that marginal bene…t is zero or negative once revenue exceeds . Analysis of this strategic setting yields the following:
In the absence of knowledge about the realized value of and two public providers, and assuming conditions (10) and (9) hold, all equilibria satisfying Assumption P consist of pooling equilibria in which legislators emulate each other's o¤ erings with a 1 = a 2 = ; where 2 [0; 1] ; and charge identical prices
Proof: For existence, recall that when a 1 = a 2 and p 1 = p 2 , D 1 = D 2 = 1=2: Thus, with p 1 = p 2 2 [c + 2 ; K], it is clear that 1 = 2 = ; and therefore U 1 = U 2 = U q ( ) r( ) = U w: Because this is the maximal payo¤ that can be achieved by each player individually, no player has an a¢ rmative incentive to deviate and Assumption P is clearly satis…ed.
To see that all equilibria must be in this set, observe that in any locational pooling equilibrium with a 1 = a 2 it must also be the case that p 1 = p 2 ; if not, one provider would earn zero pro…t, and could do strictly better by matching (or beating) the lower price. Moreover, the only locational pooling equilibria with prices below c + 2 is at p 1 = p 2 = c: To see this, note that for any posited equilibrium with identical prices on the interval (c; c + 2 ) ; each …rm has a strict incentive to undercut the prescribed equilibrium price by some arbitrarily small amount ". This incentive to undercut one's rival abates only at the Bertrand outcome where the providers price at marginal 9 When costs are less than quadratic, the separation between may fall short of the corner solutions stated in the text. See, e.g., Economides (1986) . What is critical for most of our argument, however, is the existence of separation of the …rms, and not the degree of that separation. This separation persists even when providers do not fully di¤erentiate their o¤erings, and even (in a probabilistic sense) when the only equilibrium for private providers is in mixed strategies (as is the case, for instance, when incorporating …rms face linear distance costs).
cost. But because the Bertrand outcome is pareto dominated by the set of equilibria stated in the Proposition, it is ruled out by Assumption P. Now consider potential equilibria that involve locational separation (i.e., without loss of generality, a 1 < a 2 ). In any such equilibrium, regardless of prices charged, the players must split the market into two segments, in which customers on the interval [0; x ] go to provider 1 (with the remainder going to provider 2), and where x 2 [0; 1]. If x 1 2 ; then player 1's payo¤ is w (0) = w whenever = 2 ; as it will have a zero market share: Similarly, if x 1 2 ; the same is true for player 2 whenever = 1 . Thus, regardless of x ; one of these outcomes will occur at least 1 2 of the time, which is Pareto inferior from an ex ante standpoint to the posited pooling equilibrium, violating Assumption P.
The intuition and generalization behind this result underscores a key feature of public provision. While it is true, as much of the literature on regulatory competition assumes 10 , that states will be loathe to enact laws that run the risk of being disfavored by incorporating …rms, the legislative incentive to provide "optimal" corporate law is truncated by the fact that legislators do not enjoy any bene…t from marginal pro…ts once they have reached the point at which the marginal cost of converting those public pro…ts into improved reelection chances exceeds the marginal private bene…t from a higher probability of reelection. Emulating existing o¤erings guarantees a 1=n share of the market; prices will then be set to maximize the private bene…t available from generating state revenues. Legislators can do no better by o¤ering di¤erentiated corporate law regimes and indeed, given the positive probability that they will lose all corporate law revenues and will, under our assumption that corporate law revenues have some reelection bene…t, do strictly worse.
Neither the public nor the private solution coincides with the social optimum (in the sense of minimizing the summed expected costs of consumers and producers). Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that private provision, in general, comes closer in welfare terms. This is demonstrated in our next proposition.
Proposition 4:
In the absence of information about the realized value of , and under Assumption P, private provision of corporate law imposes social costs that are weakly lower than those imposed by public provision. Moreover, for any public provision equilibrium in which 6 = 1 2 ; private provision is strictly preferred on a social cost basis.
Proof: Under the equilibrium with private providers, total social costs are given by:
Under the pooling equilibrium with public providers, total expected social costs are:
Comparing the expected social costs for public and private provision yields:
Note that this equality is strict for all 6 = 1 2 : Thus, in no instance does any equilibrium of the public chartering game satisfying Assumption P achieve a lower level of expected social costs than does private provision.
Private provision, although it is distorted from the …rst-best by the imperfect competition that characterizes spatial markets, nonetheless outperforms public provision because some di¤erentiation in regimes is better than none when incorporating …rms are, in expectation, uniformly distributed. With only a single location to choose from under public provision, the …rms that must "travel" the greatest distance (distort their optimal governance structure the most) will in general have to travel further than they would if there are two or more di¤erentiated providers, as there are under private provision. Only in the special case in which public regulators all choose to locate in the middle of the interval-in which case the maximum distance travelled is 1=2-does public provision match private provision in welfare terms.
Dynamic Equilibrium
We now turn to consider what happens when there are multiple periods and the potential for learning the true value of . In particular, consider a 2-period extension of the model with no discounting, and let t 2 f1; 2g index the relevant period; let a t 1 ; a t 2 denote the locations of the …rms at each period, and let p t 1 ; p t 2 denote the prices charged by the …rms in each period. Legislators face re-election at the end of each period.
The importance of the dynamic context in our analysis is informational. Repeat play creates the potential for the parties to learn about the underlying characteristics of the population, regardless of whether they are private providers or public providers. In considering these two cases below, we assume throughout that before choosing a second period strategy, the providers observe the location choices, price choices and market shares of each provider which obtained during period 1. As before, we presume that all providers know the distribution of F (x j ).
Proposition 5:
In a dynamic regime with the potential for learning the true value of , it is socially optimal to adopt di¤ erentiated locations in period 1 and to learn. In particular, it is socially optimal to set a Proof: The optimal period 1 solution, as shown in Proposition 1, is for providers to di¤ erentiate in location. Note that any time the …rms di¤ erentiate as to location, learning is possible so long as (p 2 p 1 ) 2 a 2 2 a 2 1 ; (a 2 a 1 ) (2 a 1 a 2 ) , so that x is interior on (0; 1). Given that the social planner's static optimum stipulates (p 2 p 1 ) = 0 and calls for locational separation, it cannot be improved upon in the dynamic game. Thus, the optimal locations for the second period will depend on whether provider 1 or provider 2 serves all …rms in the …rst period, implying = 1 or = 2 (respectively). In period 2, …rms are known to be uniformly distributed on [0; : Of importance, learning turns out to be a costless by-product of any product di¤erentiation that characterizes the socially optimal solution in period 1. Similarly, it is easy to see that private pro…t-maximizing providers will also learn the true value of as a consequence of di¤erentiation in period 1.
Proposition 6:
In the dynamic regime with the potential to learn, the unique equilibrium outcome for private pro…t-maximizing providers is to adopt di¤ erentiated period 1 locations as speci…ed in Proposition 2, and then to infer the value of from …rst-period market shares. If = 1 , then …rm 1 will remain at a 2 1 = 0 in period 2 while …rm 2 will move to a 2 2 = 1 2 , and the …rms will charge p 2 1 = p 2 2 = c + 4 : If = 2 , then …rm 2 will remain in the same location in period 2 while …rm 1 will move to a 2 1 = 1 2 ; and the …rms will charge p 2 1 = p 2 2 = c + 4 :
Proof : The period 1 equilibrium, as shown in Proposition 2, is for providers to be di¤ erentiated at fa 1 ; a 2 g = f0; 1g : Assuming this …rst period equilibrium persists in the dynamic game (see below), the period 1 outcome would induce precise learning about : either provider 1 serves all …rms, implying = ; or provider 2 serves all …rms, implying that = 2 . As such, under this posited equilibrium, in period 2 the …rms are known to be uniformly distributed on [0;
. In any of these cases, as demonstrated in Proposition 2, the incentives of private providers is to di¤ erentiate maximally in locations within the support of the relevant posterior distribution. This immediately yields the locations stated in the proposition. Given that the …rms always obtain the bene…ts of learning when they di¤ erentiate their o¤ erings in period 1, they can do no better in that period than play the static equilibrium in period 1 (which maximizes their static payo¤ s in that period.)
As with the social planning problem, under private provision learning is a costless by-product of the di¤erentiation that maximizes static pro…ts for each provider in the …rst period. The opportunity to learn creates an opportunity to increase pro…ts in period 2. The intuition behind the particular result for period 2 can be seen by recognizing that when learning occurs at the end of period 1, one of the private providers will discover that its market share exceeds one-half because the distribution of incorporating …rms is skewed towards the corporate regime o¤ered by that provider. Recall that even with the expected uniform distribution, this provider is driven to the end-point of the interval because marginal pro…ts are everywhere increasing in distance from the other provider. With the actual distribution even more pro…table at this point, the incentive to increase distance remains, again driving the provider to the end-point. Moreover, with a larger share of the distribution at this endpoint, the competitive pressure on pricing is reduced and so even this e¤ect drives the provider to increase, not decrease, distance from the competitor. On the other hand the provider which …nds itself at the opposite end of the interval, with less than half the market (actually, zero given our distributional assumption), now has an incentive to move closer to the mass of the distribution.
Public providers, on the other hand, do not face an incentive to learn and continue to emulate each other even when there is the potential to learn.
Proposition 7:
In the dynamic regime with the potential to learn, under Assumption P, public providers adopt the same undi¤ erentiated locations in period 1 as in Proposition 3, and each enjoys a 1/2 market share. As such, neither is able to infer the realized value of , and they therefore repeat the static equilibrium in period 2.
Proof: Begin with period 2 and suppose for a contradiction that di¤ erentiated locations have been chosen and thus learning has occurred in period 1. In any full information equilibrium in period 2 satisfying Assumption P it must be the case that both legislators choose location and price so that 1 = 2 = because this maximizes utility and can be achieved, as we saw in Proposition 3, by pooling and setting p 1 = p 2 c + 2 . Because this maximum level of utility can be achieved without learning, however, di¤ erentiation in period 1 does not increase utility in period 2. The as shown in Proposition 3, under Assumption P, legislators will continue to pool in period 1.
This result follows directly from the basic result in Proposition 3, that legislators have no incentive to do better than achieving the pro…t level that maximizes their private return, . Since this target can be met without learning, there is no incentive to learn. Even if learning does occur, legislators will continue to emulate each other and maximize the private bene…t from public revenues; there is no risk of being "left out" if other legislators choose to learn.
Our …nal proposition demonstrates that even in the dynamic case, private provision always imposes strictly lower social costs than does public provision of corporate law.
Proposition 8:
In a dynamic regime with the potential for learning the true realization of , under Assumption P, private chartering imposes expected social costs that are strictly lower than those imposed by public chartering.
Proof: Consider …rst public provision, in which the static pooling equilibrium is simply repeated. Under public provision, expected social costs (as demonstrated in Proposition 4) are equal to 
Thus total expected social costs under public provision exceed those attributable to public provision if and only if:
Note that the left hand side of the above inequality is minimized when = 1 2 : Imposing this lower bound on the left hand side of the above expression yields:
which is clearly satis…ed for all > 0; and thus in the dynamic game, public provision imposes a larger expected social cost regardless of the pooling location .
As seen above in Proposition 6, the adaptation induced through learning about population characteristics (i.e., ) leads the private provider at the high mass end of the distribution of incorporating …rms to remain at the endpoint of the interval and the other private provider to move closer to the mass of the distribution. This reduces the distance that incorporating …rms have to "travel," that is, the extent to which they have to deviate from their optimal governance regime. Overall, under private provision adaptation in the face of information about the true value of reduces the total travelling and hence social costs relative to the period 1. Public provision, on the other had, shows no adaptation and hence no gain relative to period 1. Since we have already seen that public provision in the static case has too little di¤erentiation relative to private provision, it follows that when we add the potential social bene…ts of learning, public provision continues to be outperformed by private provision. Public provision lacks di¤erentiation and lacks learning. Both e¤ects lead to the superiority of private provision of corporate law.
Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis above spotlights at least two speci…c reasons that the provision of corporate law by pro…t-maximizing …rms can achieve greater e¢ ciency than when corporate law is provided by public entities. In the static oneshot case, private entities o¤er di¤erentiated regimes for a heterogeneous population of incorporating …rms, which is closer to the …rst-best than the emulation exhibited by public regulators. Public regulators motivated by private bene…ts essentially act in a risk-averse fashion: they can maximize the re-election (or other private bene…t) payo¤ from generating state revenues by emulating the o¤erings of other public regulators and see no bene…t to di¤erentiation.
In the dynamic case, di¤erentiation among private providers provides a further social bene…t, namely information about the true distribution of incorporating …rms. Private providers then respond to the incentive to innovate and improve their o¤erings to achieve a better …t with the diverse needs of the market. The emulation that characterizes public provision, however, imposes a further cost in dynamic environments, as it fails to generate socially useful information about the actual distribution of incorporating …rms. Even here, the functional risk-aversion that emanates from re-election goals gives public regulators no incentive to gamble in order to learn more about the needs of the incorporating population.
The characteristic of public provision that our model predicts-with public providers clumping at a single point and failing to provide di¤erentiated regimes that may be better tailored to a diverse population of incorporating …rms-…nds some support empirically as well. Consider, for example, the following chart summarizing various state takeover laws during the 1990s that are tracked by the Investor Responsibility Research Center. For each such provision, the chart depicts the percentage of states who have adopted it in each reported year. 11 FIGURE 1: State Corporation Law Provisions During the 1990s.
At least two aspects of the …gure are interesting, and consistent with our thesis. First, there appears to be remarkable stability during the decade: On only eight in thirteen years did a state alter any of its reported corporate law provisions between reporting years -and only one state (Nevada) altered more than one provision during the decade. Given how turbulent the 1990s were from an economic perspective, one might predict that a pro…t maximizing set of providers would …nd it optimal to alter their legal structures to adapt to the changing environment. Apparently, however, very few did.
The second interesting feature is to note the clustering of the tracked legal landscape across states. Of the six legislative areas tracked, four of them are consistetly clustered at over 85%, and three of them over 92% of states. Moreover, the variety of statutory patterns among states appears to be relatively small. A principal components analysis, in fact, reveals that three factors are capable of explaining over 80% of the variation in the state-level data. 12 This signi…cant clumping and relative homogeneity 1 1 These include business compition laws, fair price laws, control share laws, cash out laws, and multi-constituency laws. 1 among states is fully consistent with our analysis. To be sure, these measures fail to capture the extent to which some state court systems (e.g., Delaware's chancery courts) enjoy a comparative advantage in quality of adjudication over other competor states (e.g., Kahan & Kamar, 2001; 2002) , but the apparent inactivity of state legislatures seems nonetheless telling.
Our model also provides some basis for another observation that is sometimes made about the nature of state competition over corporate law, namely that states are motivated by their interest in not losing, as opposed to gaining, corporate law business. Macey and Miller (1987) and Eisenberg (1983) suggest that Delaware, for example, may be particularly motivated to adapt its corporate law so as not to lose what has becomes a signi…cant source of revenue for the state treasury. Our model captures this in equilibrium reasoning: our public providers pool on a single location, and do not risk di¤erentiation even in a dynamic setting, because they risk real losses if the state loses "customers" and do not perceive any real gain from trying to attract a larger market share.
An important generalization of our model would treat the number of providers, public or private, as an endogenous feature of equilibrium. Our conjecture is that this generalization would magnify the di¤erences between public and private provision. Free entry will introduce, in the case of private provision, the possibility of excessive di¤erentiation as sometimes characterizes models with spatial competition. Free entry (and exit) under public provision, however, may well reduce the number of public providers. Public providers essentially divide up the possible revenues from servicing the needs of incorporating …rms in order to maximize the private bene…ts derived from public revenues. As the number of public providers increases and hence the market share of each provider decreases, the price that must be charged in equilibrium increases: as we saw, equilibrium requires a price that nets the revenues of .
Perhaps more interestingly, however, is the e¤ect of introducing heterogeneity among legislators in terms of , the equilibrium revenue target for maximizing private bene…ts. Legislators in states with smaller populations and hence smaller state budgets overall may have lower and may be able to e¤ectively underprice competitor legislators from large states. Larger states may also be ones in which the "productivity" of corporate law revenues from the legislator's reelection perspective (q 0 ( )) is low or negligible, due to the low salience of this source of revenue; low salience may also make the cost of transforming corporate law revenue increases into improved reelection chances (r 0 ( )) high, implying that legislators in larger states will be relatively uninterested in competing for corporate law revenues. Our con-jecture is that introducing heterogeneity (in concert with endogenous entry) is likely to lead to the result that corporate law is provided only by states where is relatively low. Such a result would shed interesting light on the fact that, as we observe, the provision of corporate law is not only in fact concentrated in a dominant state but that the dominant state-Delaware-is small. 13 A more general model might also take into account the role of courts, in addition to legislators, in developing corporate law. Courts learn from their adjudications about the nature of the …rms they regulate. There is a literature, beginning with Posner (1973) devoted to assessing the claim that judge-made law will evolve to e¢ ciency. Several authors have demonstrated limitations to the capacity of courts to develop e¢ cient rules through adjudication. For example, Had…eld (1992) has argued that learning through serial adjudication may be hampered by selection bias on the learning path, and similarly Talley (1999) has analyzed whether legal precedent has the makings of an information cascade. Ostensibly, legislators face the capacity to overcome these judicial constraints on learning: they can be proactive and not merely reactive in collecting data. As our model has shown, however, they may not face the incentive to take advantage of their superior capacity (relative to courts) to learn.
An expanded model might also take more explicit account of the role of interest groups-such as the legal profession-in generating incentives for states to produce corporate law. Our model provides a partial analysis of the role of interest groups: we can interpret the "public" pro…ts generated from corporate law to include the pro…ts earned by lawyers in the state. (Macey and Miller (1987) discuss the role of the legal profession in the development of Delaware corporate law.) From the legislator's perspective, these pro…ts may also be transformed into a private bene…t at some cost, and we would expect again that in equilibrium legislator's may have exhausted the cost-e¤ective use of this source of revenues to improve reelection chances. Our model is not, however, a complete model of the role of lawyers as an interest group, both because it does not take into account how lawyers price their services nor does it consider the possibility that lobbying e¤orts by the corporate bar may be directed speci…cally to the enactment of particular corporate law provisions. In our model, campaign contributions from interest groups are implicitly assumed to arise simply from the gener-ation of wealth for the group, not from the enactment of speci…c legislative proposals. Our model does provide a framework for analyzing these more particularized interest group e¤ects, notably because we show that almost any location can be an equilibrium under public provision. This would allow interest group preferences over speci…c locations (such as corporate law that encourages higher litigation rates, bene…tting the legal profession, as Macey and Miller (1987) suggest) to be incorporated.
Models with more complex descriptions of public incentives to create law will not, however, displace our fundamental point that public providers do not face pro…t-maximization incentives and hence public "competition" over the provision of law will not, in general, mimic market provision. Public providers face a cost in transforming public revenues into private bene…ts. This is an insight that applies not only to state competition over corporate law but, indeed, to the wide range of settings in which the economic theory of regulatory competition (Stigler 1971 , Peltzman 1976 ) is applied.
In fact, we ultimately seek to shift the debate about regulatory competition onto di¤erent terrain than the traditional literature. That literature focuses only on competition between public entities, looking for ways in which that competition might mimic competition between pro…t-maximizing …rms. But when law is addressed to its economic function-when "good" law is de…ned in terms of its capacity to structure e¢ cient market relationships such as those between shareholders and managers in the corporation-there is no obvious reason why this law should be provided by the state. Indeed, the basic premise of market democracies is that the market will, in general, do a better job than the state in achieving e¢ ciency goals in the design and provision of services, in producing what Romano (1985) called "law as product." Law in its economic function, we claim, is an economic input. Showing that private provision will outperform public provision of this input is not that di¤erent from showing that private provision of any good or service will generally outperform public provision because of the bene…ts of pro…t-maximization incentives.
We do not, however, want to give short-shrift to two important limitations on this point. First, as we recognize throughout modern market democracies, real-life competitive markets often depart from the ideal and often will require public regulation and intervention to overcome market failures. If market failures are su¢ ciently severe, it may be that public provision is preferable: in this setting the choice is a matter of comparative institutional competence and performance. We would expect that a more complete inquiry into the private provision of corporate law would have to examine the potential for market failures and hence the need for regulation aimed at structuring e¢ cient markets for private law provision.
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, we recognize that not all features of "corporate law" are concerned exclusively with e¢ ciency. Modern market democracies seek to achieve multiple goals, only one of which is e¢ cient production of goods and services. Our model measures the social bene…ts of corporate law in e¢ ciency terms only. We do not by this intend to claim that non-e¢ ciency goals have no place in corporate law. The achievement of non-e¢ ciency goals, however, is not displaced by private provision of those features of corporate law that are e¢ ciency-based. The world of private corporate law regimes is still a world subject to public regulation. Even if the rules governing judicial scrutiny of managerial discretion or the use of takeover defenses are set by a private corporate law regime with e¢ -ciency goals in mind, that does not preclude public regulation if and where non-e¢ ciency values are at stake, such as politically-determined limitations on …rm size or labor force and community disruption from takeovers.
Our basic claim, however, is that we would do well to recognize that law simultaneously serves both narrow economic/e¢ ciency functions and broader democratic functions. To the extent that the former matters (even if only as a factor of the larger analysis), there is good reason to explore the potential for private provision of law.
